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Abstract 
Scholars today continue to debate over specifically how the Former Soviet Union 
collapsed in late 1991. Unfortunately they must depend on poor Soviet data that is 
largely unreliable and faulty. Much of it is ambiguous and therefore cannot be trusted 
with great significance. This is a theoretical analysis and empirical study. I postulate 
that the weak socialist fundamentals that supported the Soviet Union led it its imminent 
collapse. The Soviet Union economic model promoted excess centralization, vast 
amounts of inefficiencies and faulty priorities. External factors and economic shocks 
also prevented the Soviet Union from allocating their resources to their best uses. The 
Cold War, the largest external shock to the Soviet economy, resulted in large defense 
spending, which caused this internal economic collapse. I attempt to determine to what 
extent the Cold War impacted the economy in the long run and conclude that socialist 
theories fail to respond to such shocks. The Soviet Union deviated from these socialist 
principles, and I show this by examining Soviet behavior, including the theory of 
cognitive dissonance and how they ignored long-term problems (blat), which only 
exasperated the challenges Gorbachev faced. I draw appropriate conclusions of 
Gorbachev‘s economic reforms, in that they were inconsistent with economic models of 
Leninist-Marxist theories.   
 
 
 
 Introduction  
 This work is divided up into various sections, each of which acts as a ―variable‖ 
within a much broader equation, answering the question: which factors led to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union? Part one consists of macroeconomic variables, including 
output per worker (and subsequent income per worker), the various Gross National 
Income (GNI) levels, and special characteristics of centralized planning. Part one also 
contains detailed analysis of early Soviet mistakes, such as War Communism and the 
brief era of the New Economic Policy, or NEP. Later sections debate the costs and 
benefits Soviet society faced as a result of centralized planning, including trade 
imbalances and capital growth levels. Each variable is weighted to see if it improved, 
hindered, or had little to no effect on social welfare. Analyis of these costs and benefits 
is provided. 
 Part two analyzes economic and political shocks to the Soviet Union. Primary 
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fundamentals of the Soviet system were not coordinated to respond to shocks to its 
economy (e.g. natural and man-made disasters, wars, political hostility, etc.) since prices 
were fixed, dampening short term economic growth. The most important variables 
analyzed herein are (1) military expenditures during the Cold War, (2) Gorbachev‘s 
attempt to revive the economy by implementing policies that disrupted socialist 
fundamentals, most notably perestroika and glasnost’.   
Part three deals primarily with microeconomic variables. I attempt to show how 
the macroeconomic variables in part one changed social behavior in the long run. It was 
common in the Soviet era to work around the inefficient system to get even basic goods 
and services. One of the most troubling behaviors was cognitive dissonance, or the 
ignorant misunderstanding and even acceptance of serious problems. Another behavior 
that hindered the Soviet economy from recovering was the notion of blat, or an informal 
network of acquantances to accomplish certain tasks. Both of these behavioral patterns, 
in their own unique ways, are correlated with the same problems related to centralized 
planning, which even dampened Russia‘s success as an emerging country in the 1990s.  
 Finally, part four reaches the conclusion that socialist model implemented in the 
Soviet Union was bound to fail because of its (1) obsession to maintain political power 
at all costs, (2) faulty priorities, which led to inefficiencies, (3) high emphasis on military 
and defense spending, and (4) inability to handle external shocks. For the purposes of 
this thesis, I have divided Soviet economic history into four broad periods, as shown in 
Table 1: 
Table 1 – Soviet Union Economic History, 1917 - 1991 
Period Title Years Policies and Major Events 
1 Primitive Socialism 1917 - 28 Civil War, War Communism, NEP 
2 Stalinism 1928 – 53 Start of 5 year plans, Depression, WWII 
3 De-Stalinization 1953 - 85 De-centralization, Stagnation, Cold War 
4 Perestroika 1985 – 91 Economic and political reform, revolution 
Source: Author 
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Politics and economics go hand in hand, particularly when the centralized 
government is controlling the economy (the inputs and outputs). Many political and 
economic policies are closely intertwined, and it is important to see and understand this 
correlation. Let us begin in period one, or the early attempt to establish socialism. 
1. Macroeconomic Planning in the Soviet Union  
1.1 The Early Policies of Period One 
 From the very outset the Soviet Union failed at providing simple consumer 
commodities. The Bolshevik party faced many challenges after the successful October 
revolution in 1917. Lenin, noticing that much of the world was preoccupied with World 
War I, saw a ―window of opportunity‖ to fully implement his propaganda movement 
to transform Russia ―from capitalism to socialism, not only politically but also socially 
and economically‖ (Bandelin). Leninism, as it would be known, was ―Marxism in the 
epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution‖ (What is Leninism?).1  
1.1.1 War Communism 
During the Russian Civil War (1918-21), War Communism, the economic policy 
at that time, was a complete disaster. It attempted to completely eliminate private 
production and trade. This caused extreme bitterness towards the new regime. The 
hard-line Communists were determined to eliminate any capitalist sector, because as 
long as capitalists stayed in Russia, profits were possible, giving capitalists a share of 
power that could potentially be a strong enough influence to even challenge the young 
regime (Kennan). Nonetheless, the civil war made the country worse off economically 
and experienced more casualties than that of World War I (4 million to 20 million) 
(Bandelin). This was largely due to dictatorship imposed by the Communists. This 
coercion, as Lenin believed, was only necessary during the transitional phase from 
capitalism to socialism, and finally to Communism, the final result.  
                                                 
1 i.e. it is simply the Russian application of Marxist theory, found in the Communist Manifesto (1848) that 
Lenin implemented in the October Revolution of 1917.   
6 
 
 Further, coercion was required because these political, economical and social 
changes clashed with the citizenry, where it was crucial ―to protect socialist gains until 
Communism was realized‖ (Bandelin). This was largely due to Bolshevik ideology: all 
truth is interconnected, throughout all sciences, and physical coercion is justified 
because it brings about social change. Kennan once stated that ―[the Communist 
regime] alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that 
good once their power was secure and unchallengeable‖ (Kennan). In other words, they 
would not tolerate any activity that had any chance of gaining momentum to rival the 
Communist Party (Kennan). Thus coercion usually achieved its goals, but it came at a 
high cost to society. The huge economic growth in the 1930s was Stalinism at its best, 
partly because force was taken beyond what was required. Stalin wanted to quickly 
alleviate Russia from its backwardness and become a highly-industrial society within a 
short amount of time, which poses the question: what is an appropriate growth rate for 
a given economy? Is too much short-term growth bad for long-term growth?   
Lenin persuaded many throughout the world that capitalism was inheritably 
bad, and what he called ―super profits‖ in advanced economies were responsible for 
exploitative activities taking place in less developed economies (Sowell, Economic Facts 
and Fallacies). This was Lenin‘s political argument for income differences, which, 
according to Sowell, was not based ―on empirical evidence and logic‖ (Sowell, 
Economic Facts and Fallacies). He, like other early leaders, was so adamant in power-
grabbing and retaining that power that they spent little time figuring out their long-term 
economic plans. In this primitive stage of socialism, leaders lacked the following basic 
tasks in planning a socialist economy, which rules and conditions Marx had established 
decades before:  
 
 (a) Establish the social needs of the people and strive to achieve them. 
 (b) Know how to effectively allocate resources to their most efficient use, in both the short and 
 long term. 
 (c) Strive for high economic growth relative to the growth of output and consumption. 
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 (d) Balance the various sectors in the economy in an appropriate ratio to each other (i.e. do not 
 shift all available capital and labor to one sector while leaving few elements remaining in the 
 other sectors). 
 (e) Maintain the best conditions for economic, political, and technological stability (Berri). 
 
 These conditions could not be established for several reasons, largely due to 
external factors that the young socialist economy simply could not handle: 
 
Russia, at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century, was in the process of 
embarking on the path of Modern Economic Growth. Russia's per capita GDP growth 
rates became considerably higher, although they remained very unstable. Second, the 
world was also changing, and expanding international competition compelled many 
advanced states to enhance conventional and human capital formation and enlarge 
productivity growth. Third, in order not to go on falling behind the West, Russia ought to 
have made a lot – in carrying out much ‗deeper‘, comprehensive market-oriented 
reforms, in creating vital, sound institutions and activating civil society. However, up to 
the First World War its developmental model remained very unbalanced. There was 
great and rising divide between modern ‗westernized‘ and traditional sectors and 
substantial income inequality (1 percent of the population possessed 16 to 20 percent of 
national income). The managerial, entrepreneurial and general cultural level of the 
Russian population was on average abysmally low. The war activated destructive forces 
in Russian society, which was not prepared for such an ordeal (Meliantsev). 
 
Suppose, for example, that the growth rate of the country is not known: centralized 
planners would then be allocating resources to the wrong industries. This would not be 
in line with a balanced ratio of the multiple sectors in the economy and would violate 
rules (b) and (d). Further, if economic leaders pass proposals that deviate from socialist 
norms (as Gorbachev had done in the 1980s) then rule (e) would be violated. This is not 
some abstract idea. In reality this did happen, and research has shown the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was largely inefficient for these very reasons (Sowell, 
Basic Economics: A Common Sense Guide to the Economy). The early revolutionists put 
much of the blame on the Civil War itself. It was a serious hindrance to their 
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advancement of Communism. Figure 1 shows the decline in Gross National Income 
(GNI)2 between 1916 and 1924: 
 
Figure 1 - GNI Growth in the Soviet Union, 1900 – 1991 
 
Source: Simchera, Vasily. Razvitie ekonomiki Rossii za 100 let. Moskva: Rossiskaya Akademiya Nauk, 2006. 
 
Lenin openly admitted the gross errors his party had made during this time. He 
stated ―We reckoned – [or] we presumed without reckoning adequately – on being able 
to organize the state production and the state distribution of products on communist 
lines in a small-peasant country directly by an order of the proletariat. Experience has 
proved that we were wrong‖ (Riha). In other words, the Soviet Union was still 
primitive for such radical economic policies, on both macro and microeconomic levels. 
Lenin and other revolutionists knew that if the economy continued to deteriorate the 
country would collapse and the 1917 revolution would come to naught. They 
formulated a plan they envisioned would transform the Soviet economy that would 
ultimately lead them to communism.  
                                                 
2 GNI measures national economic activity. It is ―the total market value of all final goods and services 
produced by the residents of a country in a given period of time‖ (Black, Hashimzade and Myles). It can 
also be referred to as GDP or GNP. It is synonymous to national income.  
1
10
100
1000
10000
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
M
ill
io
n
 o
f 
R
u
b
le
s
Years
9 
 
The failure of War Communism is an important variable in our equation because 
it was the first of many policies that contributed to the shortages that would define the 
Soviet era. It shows that the centralized government never put consumer demands 
before their own. Agricultural surpluses, a form of profits, were not allowed 
whatsoever. Surpluses, had they been legal, would have benefited society. But the 
young regime would not tolerate ―super profits.‖ 
1.1.2 The New Economic Policy (NEP)  
As a result of this policy failure, Lenin announced in the 10th Congress of the All-
Russian Communist Party (ARCP) in March 1921 a form of state capitalism known as 
the New Economic Policy, or NEP. Now effectively a despotic form of government, the 
Soviet Union adopted this form of capitalism, a ―U-turn‖ policy, as it was just another 
road to socialism. This was not, however, a return to capitalism, rather it was 
―revitalization… through entrepreneurial initiative[s]‖ (Bandelin). Marx had predicted 
that a world-wide revolution would begin in industrial, stable economies before 
spreading to other areas. Lenin knew that the only way to achieve this world-wide 
revolution and to get the economy booming again was to soften up on politics, and 
create an entrepreneurial atmosphere in the short run:   
 
―The problem is that a responsible Communist, even the best, who is known for honesty 
and dedication, having suffered penal servitude and who did not fear death, does not 
know how to trade, because he is not a businessman. He has not learned to trade, does 
not want to learn and does not understand that he must start learning from the beginning 
… [He] does not know business, and does not even know that he does not know it.‖ V.I. 
Lenin (Bandelin). 
 
By implementing the NEP, Lenin hoped to be able to eliminate the inefficiencies of the 
bourgeoisie, which the revolution should have achieved. Instead, he replaced those 
inefficiencies with his own!3 Vital to socialism was the ―guidance of bourgeois experts 
                                                 
3 This is because many of his ideas were theoretical in nature and not based on empirics. In addition, 
Soviet propaganda was built on these very ideas, deceiving many and changing Russian mentality.   
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in technology and management experience,‖ as this resulted in ―greater labor 
productivity‖ (Bandelin). But this was not the long term goal. A sophisticated social-
democratic system would later ―equalize the distribution of profits through the seizure 
of ownership 4  of the economic infrastructure and natural resources from the 
bourgeoisie and reforming key institutions and industries to serve the needs of the 
proletariat and poor peasantry‖ (Bandelin). Lenin understood that the only way to 
abolish bourgeois oppression of the working class would be to educate workers, 
increasing their capabilities (skills), which ultimately allowed for greater efficiency to 
transpire in the production process. 5  Lenin was convinced that only a Soviet 
government would rid the people‘s negative view of government, since the Russian 
government and bourgeoisie for years had oppressed and robbed the Russian people 
(Bandelin). Hence the road to socialism was implemented in this manner.  
Another serious problem confronting the early revolutionists in the Soviet Union 
was the sheer economic backwardness, a word often used by 19th century Russian 
novelists (e.g. Dostoevsky, Turgenev, and Tolstoy, to name a few) when describing 
Russian society in their works. P. Tkachev wrote that ―…the [state‘s] power is only 
apparent and imagined; it has no roots in the economic life of the people, and it does 
not embody the interests of any class‘‖ (Freeze). The fundamental reason for the 
revolution was to avoid the dissolution of the commune, which represented most of the 
population at that time.  
After the establishment of communism, revolutionists knew that to achieve 
strong economic growth, they would need to invest in heavy industrialization: the 
Soviet Union had been lacking in and were in critically low levels of machinery and 
                                                 
4 It is important to remember why Lenin sought a revolution in Russia at all. In his 1901 pamphlet ―What 
is to be Done?‖ Lenin describes terrible injustices heaved upon the working class brought on by the 
bourgeoisie. In an attempt to rally a new ―democratic party of reform,‖ Lenin hoped to combine a party 
of reform and a party of revolution (V. I. Lenin). He was opposed to any separation of politics and 
economics. In his view the tsarist regime was to be overthrown to make way for socialist economics to 
take root. This in turn would create opportunities for the working class, a true form of democracy. The 
bourgeois could not possibly exploit the working class as they had under the tsarist capitalist system.     
5 i.e., to alleviate Russia‘s backwardness, it needed enormous number of engineers and technicians and 
various schools to train them. Nearly all railway workers during the 1930s had at least some technical 
education, which enhanced the interconnecting the vast regions of the Soviet Union.  
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foodstuffs during WWI and the subsequent Civil War. In addition, cooperation with the 
peasantry in the Russian countryside was culturally significant. If enough uprisings 
were to occur, chaos would ensue, thus threatening the very outcomes of the revolution 
itself. Essentially, the NEP allowed for free exchange of commodities to occur, thereby 
increasing the number of peasants,6 creating a strong middle class (the peasantry was 
by far the largest social class in Russia at the time). While many advanced economies 
were suffering through the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Soviet Union was rapidly 
evolving into a powerful economic powerhouse, supported by strong military and 
defense spending (more on this in section 2.1). 
The effects of the NEP are important in the building of our equation: they were 
the foundations of the beginnings of Soviet economic policy. On the one hand, it was 
good for the Soviet Union to get back on its feet, but on the other hand, it was bad for 
the expansion of Leninist-Marxist theory. Unfortunately, Lenin‘s premature death and 
the political defeats of his most prominent heir, Bukharin, by Stalin, prevented the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) from exhibiting any long term results. It would be interesting to 
see how history would have changed had the NEP stayed and Bukharin been Lenin‘s 
successor, because it was implemented only briefly before Stalin abruptly removed it 
altogether. Unfortunately we will never know what history could have been, had the 
NEP remained policy. We only know the history of what replaced it, which were more 
centrally-designed five-year plans. 
1.1.3 Democratic Centralism 
 As the Soviet Union progressed, democratic centralism, which stood at the heart of 
Leninist-Marxist theory, began to bear significant economic fruit. It essentially allowed 
independent, local enterprises to grow under management planning of the state and 
combined centralized planning of state production, in accordance with the general 
population. Democratic centralism had increased the significance of local soviets and 
                                                 
6 Peasants were the largest social class in Russia which Lenin had divided up into ―small class[es] of rich 
exploiters (kulaki) self-sufficient ‗middle peasants‘ (seredniaki), and the revolutionary and exploited ‗poor 
peasants‘ (bedniaki) (Freeze). This was done because social status was defined by one‘s labor, of which 
peasants were ―exploiters‖ and therefore had no rights and could be used at the disposal of the regime.  
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enterprises, considered workers when writing up the five-year plans, posed solutions to 
questions regarding production efficiency and simplified state administration (Schoeck 
and Wiggins). Analysis should have been more scientific and economically based, not 
strictly theoretical. This method would have placed blame on the Communists for any 
shortcomings. But in this ―top-down‖ approach, it must be assumed that centralized 
planners did indeed have full information on the entire state of the economy. This was 
due to the idea that ―a socialist economy is based on a series of interconnected and 
coordinated plans – macroeconomic, sectoral, regional, and enterprise plans‖ (Berri). 
This heavily-coordinated planning was to achieve the greatest and most efficient 
methods of production, which in turn would have achieved greater satisfaction (in 
terms of needs) in society. The most damning burden placed on the Soviet economy 
was the enormous monetary cost in achieving this full information. In the long run, this 
could not possibly work. 
Democratic centralism thus indicates that economic leaders in Moscow were 
determining state output by merely guiding local governments‘ economic growth rate. 
There was to be direct communication between the various levels of economic councils 
where efficiency was a primary goal. One determining factor was the Communist Party 
itself, which had monopolistic capabilities: it controlled the resources, allocated goods 
and services, and provided a blanket of security to all citizens alike (i.e. one assumed 
that his needs would be provided). The Communist Party reinforced this constantly, 
causing managers of firms to scramble in order to achieve planned output.  
 
The NEP and democratic centralism are good variables in our equation because 
they portray the disproportionate ratio between excess centralization and economic 
efficiency. By decreasing micromanagement, firms and individuals are freer and can do 
as they please, and can even increase their living standards as a result of surpluses. 
They impacted short-term growth (Figure 1) but did not survive Stalin‘s ―Iron Fist.‖ 
Lenin attempted to build a utopian society where everyone was equal in status 
and where everyone pursued the same goals. In this new society, Lenin hoped to 
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maintain a strong nation, one where the Soviet Union was the chief economy in 
production and innovation, or a ―giant factory‖ (Ofer). Some of his goals included: low 
unemployment (0 to 2% on average), paying workers what they‘re worth, low 
corruption, and maximum utility (Browder). The vast Soviet empire had an abundance 
of scarce, natural resources, such as natural gas, ore, coal, timber, and arable farmland. 
One major long-term problem the revolution did not address well was their inability to 
view these resources as ―scarce‖ (Sowell). Few people will view a commodity as 
―scarce‖ so long as they have plenty of it. Knowing how to allocate goods and services 
is how a country economizes their natural resources and physical and human capital. The 
excessive centralization that took place was a substitute for trade that could have 
strengthened its relations with other economies and boosted standards of living. 
Knowing this excessive centralization is one vital aspect to understanding the standards 
of living.   
1.2 The Significance of Economic Planning on Living Standards 
Throughout periods two, three, and four the Soviet Union strived to achieve 
centralized plans, which were ―designed to satisfy the constantly rising material and 
cultural requirements of all members of [the] socialist society‖ (Yevenko). In other 
words, centralized planning was supposed to focus on meeting the demands of society. 
Hence, the Soviet people regarded these plans as their own and portrayed a zealous 
ambition to fulfill them at any cost. This ―unification‖ became their great strength and 
resulted in strong economic growth well into the 1950s. Though it was a struggle in the 
primitive stages,7 the Soviet Union eventually was able to plan specific factors of the 
economy, progressing towards a more single unified plan (i.e. towards Communism). 
Unfortunately this did not significantly alter life in Soviet Russia and did not 
improve society or the institutions that governed it (i.e. it did not raise the living 
standards by a significant margin). The Soviet Union drew nearer to other developed 
                                                 
7 It was a difficult transition for economic leaders as this was the first planned economy the world had 
ever tried to establish. It was trial and error method: ―theoretical and methodological principles, 
organizational forms, and planning methods all had to be worked out for the very first time‖ (Berri).  
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countries, as far as military and technological advances were concerned, as well as in 
health and educational indicators, both of which are vital in the labor market, but failed 
to raise the standard of living to a significant level. Meliantsev explains that 
―Russian/Soviet HDI related to that of developed countries doubled – from 29–31% to 
59–61%... the USSR failed to make progress in catching-up with the developed countries 
by GDP per capita. The relative gap with the advanced countries remained the same – 
approximately 29–31%‖ (Meliantsev). It is interesting to note that human capital in the 
Soviet Union was very high. Education is a key indicator of the HDI index, which is a 
comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living and 
correlates economic policies on the quality of life. This means that Soviet economic 
growth was driven by a high investment ratio in both military and educational 
expenditures. It was neither flexible nor adaptable like the capitalist system in the West. 
Perhaps the biggest factor that affected living standards in the Soviet Union was 
the role prices played in Soviet accounting methods. How economists distinguish 
between mediocre and superior economies depends on how much ―prices play a crucial 
role in determining how much of each resource gets used where‖ (Sowell). Prices are 
driving forces in market economies, allocating resources to their best uses. In a capitalist 
system, prices reflect scarcity, moving that good or service to the right sector. However, 
under socialism, prices take power away from the centralized authorities. Prices play a 
mere accounting role (Riha) and scarcity is not acknowledged because centralized 
planners are concerned with fulfilling the current five-year plan, which runs the entire 
economy. This is how resources are allocated – by centralized planners via the 
centralized plan they are fulfilling. Further, prices under socialism are fixed, or are 
sticky for a long period of time. Fixed prices can never determine scarcity if it does not 
correlate with demand for that good or service. The goal was not ―to have commodities, 
[goods which are privately produced for the sake of exchange], only products… [which] 
are not exchanged for one another: they are neither bought nor sold‖ (Riha). This was 
supported by Marx, who believed that labor should be aimed at providing society‘s 
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needs, not individual needs. In the long run, this greatly affected the change in living 
standards, because greater profits could have been realized. 
 Living standards are largely determined by the increase of material prosperity, 
although there are other determinants. Some determinants include the increase in the 
work force, in which industries growth is occurring (manufacturing, farming, etc.), how 
wages increase as a result of the work force increase, and pay differentials.  What is 
important here is the overall percentage increase in material prosperity, which 
according to the Human Development Index, or HDI, is measured largely by income 
and consumption. The correlation between the two is obvious: if disposable income is 
high, consumption must be high as well. Further, it is useful to understand the health 
and educational levels and their rates of change over time: the healthier workers are, 
and the greater the level of education workers have completed, the more likely 
efficiency should increase. This is due to their strong correlation to an economy‘s 
production function, which is stated in equation (1): 
 
                                                                      (1) 
where –  
    - total output 
    - total capital stock 
    – aggregate supply of labor 
 
Health and education can affect   in both positively and negatively. For example, 
a decrease in the overall health level might cause more workers to take sick leaves, 
decreasing productivity. Moreover, higher educational levels may cause productivity to 
increase, erasing any losses from the previous decrease in the overall health level. In the 
Soviet Union, unemployment was at or near zero percent, which meant that there was a 
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high amount of available labor in the workforce. Table 2 shows the relationships 
between labor, capital, and TFP8, all of which decreased as the Cold War lingered: 
 
Table 2 - Growth Rates of GNI and its Main Factors, % 
Period GDP Labor Physical 
Capital 
Stock 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Contribution 
of TFP to 
GDP growth 
1928-1940  4.6  3.3  5.3  0.7  14-16  
1950s  7.3  1.2  9.0  3.8  50-54  
1960s  4.6  1.7  8.0  1.0  20-22  
1971-1975  3.5  1.7  6.4  0.4  10-12  
1976-1980  1.2  1.2  5.6  -1.3  -108  
1981-1985  1.5  0.7  5.0  -0.5  -33  
1986-1990  0.1  0.3  2.7  -0.9  -900  
Source: Meliantsev, Vitali, A. "Russia's Economic Development in the Long Run." Social Evolution & History 3.1 
(2004): 106-136. 
 
 What were the reasons for the dwindling capital stocks and TFP? I assert that it 
was due to the lack of innovative technology and willingness to allow intuitive markets 
to control the economy. Centralized planners could not allow human capital (educated 
workers) or physical capital (e.g. computers, which can equate and predict with better 
accuracy) to control supply and demand. This would take power away from them and 
threaten their very existence. It is noteworthy to mention that during the Brezhnev era, 
―the number of computers per capita in the United States was seventeen times higher 
and a least a full generation ahead‖ (Freeze).  
 But, given the top priority communists place on education, workers should have 
been a great asset to society. The literacy rate by 1989 was 98%, equal to that of 
advanced nations. Every individual that was taught in communist schools should have 
been able to contribute his or her share to society. Their own intuition should have 
controlled the economy. This would have increased GNI even more. In the Soviet 
                                                 
8 Total Factor Productivity, or TFP, is the ―value of output to total factor inputs, aggregated at some set of 
relative prices.‖ (Black, Hashimzade and Myles). It can vary greatly depending on the level of capital, 
labor, and other inputs. It is a rough measure of efficiency. 
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Union, GNI did increase, but efficiency did not. Looking at the capital per worker and 
productivity of labor rates (how many units each worker produces in a specific time 
frame) might tell us why this was so. Equation (2) shows the relationship between 
productivity of labor and the level of employment: 
 
                                                                          (2) 
 
where -   
    – National income 
    - productivity of labor 
    – number of workers engaged in material production  
   
As long as productivity was high,  , or national income, would continue to 
grow. In capitalist societies, excluding external shocks, periods of economic slowdown 
are usually caused by monetary phenomena. This was not the case in the Soviet Union. 
Declining productivity was the problem, because planners were reluctant ―to 
modernize existing plants and [place] heavy emphasis on new construction – a policy 
that was supposed to increase output as much as possible, in the long run led to the 
declining capital productivity‖ (Popov). Within the realms of society exists laws: 
scientific, cultural, political, and economic laws. Economists and political scientists 
spend their careers trying to figure out the relationships between these laws. 
What then distinguishes socialism from capitalism? One notable difference is 
what is found in capitalism; what Leonid Brezhnev called ―spontaneous market forces.‖ 
In these capital markets, the biggest monopolies profit at the expense of society, because 
they insist their interests and demands to be met, exactly what Lenin had claimed. 
Socialists claim that under capitalism conscious social regulation is impossible. This is 
because the economic laws behind socialism ―exert themselves in it as the unforeseen 
results of activity on the part of blind forces‖ (Berri). In other words, socialism fails to 
account for expected shocks to their short and long-term planning. Therefore, their 
inadequacy is not surprising when they do respond. Socialists have their own objectives 
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and desires, which operate independently of any one single individual. Engels wrote 
that freedom is not just some imaginary independence of economic laws, but an actual 
understanding and application of those laws for the betterment of society. Central 
planners should have a sound understanding of these laws, as they reflect stable 
relationships among economic phenomena and processes in society. They must 
understand any causality between various industries and link any effects of economic 
policies to their output. In economics, regardless of which system a country follows, the 
problem of scarcity is best solved by the allocation of resources, or to which industries 
and firms material goods are transferred (Sowell, Basic Economics: A Common Sense 
Guide to the Economy). 
The foremost problem with centralized plans in the Soviet Union was this very 
misallocation of goods due to misinformation at the top. This is another major reason 
why they do not respond to external shocks very well. If an industry faced enormous 
amounts of scarcity, does anyone believe it will respond appropriately to a shock? No! 
To make matters worse, command economies are input-maximizing (see ‗Total Inputs‘ 
in Table 3). This strategy led to massive shortages, inadequate allocations, and large 
amounts of waste. However, it did not stop the Soviet Union from growing until 1960. 
Table 3 reemphasizes Table 2 and shows similar findings. It includes the categories 
economists study the most: labor, land and capital, and how they work together to 
produce GNI: 
 
Table 3 – GNI, Inputs, and Productivity, 1928 – 85 (Annual Rates of Growth)  
 1928-40 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
GNI 5.8 5.7 5.2 3.7 2.6 2.0 
Labor  3.3 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.7 
Employment 3.9 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.2 0.7 
Capital 9.0 9.5 8.0 7.9 6.8 6.3 
Land 1.6 3.3 0.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Total Inputs 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.0 2.5 
Productivity 1.7 1.6 1.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 
Source: Allen, Robert C. "The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy." The Canadian Journal of 
Economics 34.4 (2001): 859-881. 
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Noted economist Thomas Sowell has pointed out that ―production enterprises in 
the [Soviet Union] ‗always ask[ed] for more than they need[ed]‘ from the government in 
the way of raw materials, equipment, and other resources used in production‖ (Sowell, 
Basic Economics: A Common Sense Guide to the Economy). This is a flawed, alternative 
method since it is still assumed that ―full information‖ is known when plans are written 
up. Sowell states that ―knowledge is, after all, what makes something a natural 
resource‖ (Sowell, Economic Facts and Fallacies). Market prices 9  are much more 
efficient in allocating goods and services than arbitrary prices set by a central 
committee. However, in the Soviet Union this would have taken power away from the 
central planners. As noted earlier, Lenin‘s revolution was an attempt to take the ―means 
of production [out of] private hands‖ (Lenin). Thus by owning the means of production 
the Soviet regime could set arbitrary prices on the nearly 24 million products circulating 
in the economy. By so doing they hoped to be able to micromanage all factors of 
production, something socialist countries aim to do (Lange, Part One). 
Micromanagement almost always leads to inefficiency because the financial costs are 
simply too great. 
Micromanagement is a very bad strategy and very inefficient, regardless of 
location or existing premises. Having to deal with multiple macroeconomic problems 
was challenging, and managers were largely responsible for running well-functioning, 
efficient firms or plants. Unfortunately many of their own techniques (discussed in part 
3) got in the way of efficiency, contributing to losses, even if they were unaccounted for. 
Managers of firms often altered the production assortment, allowed the quality of 
products to deteriorate, falsified records, over-ordered supplies and capital equipment, 
                                                 
9 In a centralized economy prices do not determine supply or demand, and therefore do not determine 
equilibrium based on consumer preferences. It is the planners themselves who are determining 
equilibrium, i.e. they decide the price and quantity of all goods and services.  
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and resisted technological innovation (Dane). There was no incentive to work hard as 
there was never the threat of a firm closing down, creating a free rider problem.10  
Centralized planning is a heavily-weighted variable in our equation because it 
controlled everybody and everything. It was the answer to everything. It changed the 
landscape politically and most importantly, economically. Centralized planning 
changed slightly based on the General Secretary at the time and what route the Soviet 
economy was aiming for.  
1.3 Five-Year Centralized Plans and Effects on National Income 
All economic growth stemmed from five-year plans. They were the driving force 
behind all economic activity and were responsible for the progression of socialism. They 
contributed to wages, GNI, social and economic welfare, national income, capital stock, 
among many other indicators. The Soviet Union‘s Balance of Payments (BOP) affected 
their national income, which included trade. They contributed to everything discussed 
thus far, and the effects of the policies they represented. The main reason centralized 
plans failed miserably after about 1960 was that the amount of information required to 
achieve efficiency is too great, and the incentives to supply the center with reliable 
information [were] too poor (Black, Hashimzade and Myles). Centralized plans were 
designed to promote high productivity and material wealth in the Soviet Union. But the 
Soviet Union‘s average, real income per capita was extremely low!  
The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) set economic goals and high ambitions for 
the good of the country and was even broken down into yearly and quarterly plans. It 
had a more important task at hand: an ―all-round‖ development, based on the cultural, 
societal and material needs of every individual: 
 
No small efforts are…required of the Soviet economy to realize the tasks 
involved in improving the people‘s material, housing, and living 
conditions, above all to attain a level and structure of rational 
                                                 
10 Free riders are people or organizations ―who benefit from a public good but neither provide it nor 
contribute to the cost of collective provisions‖ (Black, Hashimzade and Myles). Long term effects lead to 
scarcity. 
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consumption of goods and services by scientifically validated norms. A 
drive for a high level of satisfaction of material wants is not, however, 
the be-all and end-all of the socialist economy but the means, the sine qua 
non for man‘s harmonious development. Together with growth of 
material prosperity such notable phenomena as the raising of social 
targets and priorities are occurring in the Soviet economy. This applies 
above all…to further improvement of the Soviet people‘s prosperity, 
improvement of their working and living conditions, marked progress in 
the health services, education, and culture, that is, in everything that 
furthers molding of the new man, all-round development of the 
individual, and improvement of the socialist way of life (Berri). 
 
 In other words, the Soviet Union was economically set up, such that the material 
well-being of the citizenry would be met. But equally important, socialism promised 
something better than what capitalism could provide, in overall terms of education, 
health, standard of living, and level of satisfaction every citizen generally feels. This is 
because within socialism ―individual labor becomes social labor‖ (Riha). Every Soviet 
plays a small but vital role in the development of communism. This was certainly the 
case in the early years of the Soviet Union, as mentioned earlier.  
 Certainly knowing society‘s demand schedules is truly the only way to 
understand people‘s wants and to establish an equilibrium quantity and price. The 
demand for many durable goods is calculated using a long term ―rational family 
budget‖ (Berry). Consider the following example: if centralized planners decide that 
every household should have a one television unit, then the demand will be equal to the 
number of households. Hypothetically, if the number of households equals 72, and 
obsolescence11 occurs in 8 years, the annual demand will be 9 (72:8). Including exports 
and current inventory, the number of television sets produced in one year is about 10 
                                                 
11 This is defined as a ―loss of value of equipment due to changes in techniques or tastes‖ (Black, 
Hashimzade and Myles). It generally occurs when consumer preferences change, or when technical 
progress changes or is altered, or if the technique (production method) is deemed unsafe or risky.  
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million (Berry). Generally speaking, certain criteria must be known when creating new 
five year plans: 
 
1. The volume of personal purchasing power. 
2. The structure of production of consumer goods, trade, and the stock levels of 
those goods within the economy. 
3. The impact of increased income on certain goods and individual demand 
schedules. 
4. The supply and demand shifters and how they influence price and quantity. 
5. The cycle of Normal/Inferior goods and Substitutes/Complements goods.12  
 
While many of the above criteria are abstract and very hard to determine 
quantitatively, knowing the National Income level13 is the best way to determine output 
in certain markets. The simplest model defining national income, which is equivalent to 
GNI, can be stated in the following way: 
 
                                                                                   (3) 
 
where -       
    - national income 
    - total consumption (personal + current social consumption, and the accumulation of  
  basic non-production assets) 
  -  productive accumulation (fixed assets + circulating assets, stocks, and reserves) 
   - time 
  
                                                 
12 Given the topic at hand, understanding the role of these goods is important for two main reasons. (1) 
Due to the scarcity of goods as a result of inefficiencies created by centrally planned committees (each 
individual knows his or her own preferences better than any third party can (Sowell)), tradeoffs occur, 
and society must pay for these tradeoffs, whether legal or not. (2) Since prices did not determine supply 
and demand for a good in the SOVIET UNION, most products were rationed, leaving ―what was left,‖ or 
the substitute, of the rationed good.  
13 Assuming everyone spends their money (nothing is saved) planners essentially can determine to which 
industries the flow of money is headed. Knowing this, they can appropriately ration key components to 
that industry for investment. 
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 In equation (3),   and   are the only factors of production. Trade is omitted since 
it played an insignificant role in official Soviet figures; although it had increased to a 
mere 4% of GDP in 1985 (see the next subsection). To determine efficiency, centralized 
planners had to determine the change, if any, (denoted ―delta,‖ or Δ) by either factor. In 
order for there to be an equal balance, both factors must change at the same rate. Since 
the Soviet Union was at or near full employment (0% unemployment) the labor force 
was the largest determinant of national income. Additionally, the demand for any given 
product must be determined by the change in population plus the change in consumer 
preferences. The income and subsequent consumption is related to the proportion 
between wages and ―social consumption funds‖ (Berry). Social consumption funds 
show the fastest rate of growth and ―constitute that part of consumption in national 
income which is used to satisfy the needs of members of society which cannot be 
satisfied out of wages‖ (Berry). To an extent we can see the priorities the centralized 
government placed on certain sectors and government programs. Government 
expenditure does increase national income, and carries a multiplier effect: the more the 
government invests in a certain sector, the greater the output will increase. This creates 
an increase in income, another increase in output, more government revenue and 
thereby a greater dependence on social consumption funds. Table 4 shows the 
calculation of social consumption funds: 
 
Table 4 - Calculation of Social Consumption Funds  
(conventional figures, 1,000 million rubles) 
 
 Actual 
figures 
Planned 
figures 
Care and education of young people 10 15 
Training of manpower 5 7 
Health and leisure facilities 12 18 
Care of elderly and disabled persons 11 15 
Provision of social, cultural and household services 4 6 
Total – volume of social funds (1 – 5) 42 61 
Of which  
      a)   money payments  
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            of which pensions, benefits, and grants 
      b)  material goods and services 
20 
20 
29 
30 
Distribution of social funds by social group: 
      expenditure per member of a worker’s family (in rubles)  
      expenditure per member of a peasant family (in rubles) 
 
195 
150 
 
260 
225 
Source: erry, L. Ya., ed. Planning a Socialist Economy. Trans. Jenny Warren. Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1977. 
 
1.3.1 Trade Imbalances  
 When a nation trades with another, both nations will benefit. This is based on the 
law of comparative advantage, which states that when a country has lower opportunity 
costs to produce a good or commodity, it should specialize in production of that good. 
When it trades that good for another, production will improve and consumption will 
rise because the terms of trade increase national income (Black, Hashimzade and 
Myles). Trade during the Stalin era served two purposes: to quickly alleviate Russia 
from its backwardness and to ―[widen] the capital stock and [increase] production… in 
specific branches of industry‖ (Smith). Unfortunately this dependence on imported 
technology resulted in an ―inability to generate and diffuse domestic technological 
progress‖ (Smith)(italics added). In other words, this reliance on imports hurt the 
economy in the long-run. After Stalin died in 1953, Secretaries Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
introduced very few effective economic reforms to alleviate this dependence on foreign 
trade. In fact, the trade imbalance only got worse. This is evident by the increase in 
imports in various commodities in the 1970s and 1980s, as shown in Table 5: 
 
Table 5 – Soviet Trade Increases, 1972 – 1984  
 1972 1975 1980 1982 1984 
Total 4,971 12,700 20,813 25,596 27,112 
Machinery/ Equip. 1,138 3,635 4,713 6,021 6,060 
Fuel/Energy 195 648 931 2,010 3,107 
Ores/Metals 537 2,131 3,359 3,711 3,398 
Chemicals/Fertilizers 311 737 1,528 1,496 1,718 
Wood/Paper Products 188 503 747 693 631 
Textiles 397 598 860 749 931 
Foodstuffs 1,322 3,173 6,361 7,576 8,052 
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Industrial consumer goods 439 757 1,194 1,648 1,680 
Unspecified 264 518 1,120 1,692 1,535 
Source: Allen, Robert C. "The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy." The Canadian Journal of Economics 34.4 
(2001): 859-881. 
 
 
 One major factor in this downward shift was Brezhnev himself, who did not 
have any ―personal political vision or program‖ (Suny). He did little to ―reach and 
surpass America‖ or ―build communism‖ (Suny). Rather, he emphasized scientific and 
technological innovations, or realistic expectations (i.e. the status quo). These 
expectations relied heavily on international innovation, which can explain the increase 
in trade: 
  
―Soviet imports of machinery and equipment from the West [were] determined more by 
short-term domestic economic priorities and the desire to overcome domestic shortages 
than by the pursuit of a consistent policy to overcome technological backwardness… A 
leadership that did not fully understand the potential of modern technology and was 
unwilling to decentralize decision-making to those who did… gave excessive emphasis 
to large-scale civil construction projects that utilized relatively simple processes that they 
could comprehend (A. Smith). 
 
 Trade is an important variable in our equation because it dampened domestic 
production in the long run and shows that the Soviet Union‘s long-term macroeconomic 
policies were unsustainable. It reiterates that Soviet authorities would not budge on 
their authority to conform to the needs of their own people. By so doing they thought 
they would be giving credit to the importer of that technology.  
1.3.2 Golden Rule Capital Level of Stock 
What made the economy so inefficient was the large increase in capital versus 
the output produced (GNI). I have already shown how domestic production decreased 
as a result of trade. Centralized planners were still investing in large amounts of capital, 
despite the decrease in production (i.e. their capital-to-labor ratio was extremely low 
(Ofer)). Whatever the reasons, Soviet economists were ignoring their golden rule capital 
26 
 
stock, which is the level of capital that maximizes consumption per capita. It is also the 
point where the marginal product of capital (MPK) equals the depreciation rate (∂):   
 
                    (4) 
 
where -  
    - output per unit of labor 
∂ - depreciation rate 
  - capital-labor ratio 
    - maximum consumption 
 
The problem in the Soviet Union was the high levels of capital that were 
exhaustive to the economy. Had the economic leaders emphasized equation (4) in their 
models, their capital levels would have returned to equilibrium levels, or at least been 
reduced to a more appropriate level. Depreciation rates (∂) were relatively low (around 
10 – 15%) which meant less money should have been spent on capital and should have 
been allocated to their next best alternative. In addition, had individual firms been able 
to manage the finance of repairs themselves, ―[an] elimination of [centralized] bank 
control over the expenditure of [funds]‖ would have been possible (Horwitz). This 
seemingly innocent transaction would have taken power away from centralized 
planners, something centralized planners would not tolerate. This is a case where the 
excessive bureaucratization over enterprises induced a ―perseverance of gross output 
targets and planning from an achieved level [that] caused wastes and restrained 
production‖ (Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform).  
Stalin was big on heavy industrialization, but his dream to revolutionize Russia 
has serious drawbacks, especially the allocation of funds. As a result from the XVI Party 
Congress in 1930, it was decided ―to create new centers of industry in the East, thus 
removing Soviet production from the potential danger of aggression from the West; (2) 
to industrialize the country so strongly that it would reach the industrial level of the 
West in about a decade; (3) to lay the emphasis squarely on heavy industry, at the cost 
necessarily, of other branches of the economy‖ (Mirski). For example, the Soviet Union 
government allotted funds disproportionately among industry and communications. It 
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is reported that ―from 1928-1940, the Soviet State spent 185 billion rubles for industry as 
against 61.8 billion rubles for all communications In 1939, with a total budget of 153.3 
billion, ―31.1 or 20.2% went to industry, while only 6.6 or 4.3% were allotted to 
communications‖ (Mirski). 
This problem could have been resolved easily in the short term, but the system 
was set up, such that any final plan involving major capital expenditure had to be 
negotiated with Gosplan [the State Planning Committee] and the Union Republic 
Council of Ministers. This resulted in time delays and information costs that were 
unnecessary. A simpler method would be to allow local leadership to make major 
decisions, since they were more knowledgeable than planners in Moscow who knew 
little to nothing about the proposal at hand. Financially, this intensified since the Soviet 
government did not want to borrow from abroad. I believe these disproportionate ratios 
were just one of many causes Soviet failures were so common.  
This is the last important macroeconomic variable in our equation. It is important 
because it focuses on capital investment and how it contributed to economic losses due 
to overcapitalization (e.g. military expenditures) and undercapitalization (e.g. consumer 
products) and how over time this was bound to fail.  
2. Negative Externalities  
I have shown that the Soviet Union was largely inefficient and inadaptable. This 
section examines the correlations between the Soviet Union‘s economic decline and 
external shocks, specifically defense spending, which rose dramatically during the Cold 
War (1945 - 1991) between the Soviet Union and the United States. This has been 
carefully researched by Easterly and Fischer (1995) and Bremmer and Kesselring (1998) 
and is supported by the notion that ―the percentage change in real GDP is inversely 
related to the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures‖ (Bremmer and 
Kesselring). In other words, a high military expenditure dampens investment, which 
weakens economic growth. In addition, ―low Soviet elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor…. is sufficient to explain the decline of Soviet growth‖ (Easterly and 
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Fischer). Other notable research by Ofer (1987) compares Soviet growth rates14 over 
several decades and supports the results of Easterly and Fischer. 
Another externality, the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in April 1986, has been 
studied by Lehmann and Wadsworth (2009) who examined the health, wages, 
education, and productivity of Ukrainian workers immediately after the fallout of the 
Chernobyl accident. They conclude that radiation levels in various groups (based on 
geography, population density, and age) contributed to significant economic losses, 
either psychological or physical, since, within the production function ―health [is] 
considered to be an important determinant of labor market outcomes, such as wages, 
hours of work and employment‖ (Lehmann and Wadsworth). I do not expound upon 
the Chernobyl incident in depth, other than to promote the idea that the production 
function was seriously affected in those parts of the Soviet Union. 
2.1 Military Expenditures on Economic Growth 
Based on dozens of literature reviews, Mintz and Huang (1991) postulated that 
no trade off between guns and butter15 exists in the post-WWII era. Simply put, other 
economic factors, such as health, education and consumer welfare are not significantly 
affected by an increase in military expenditure (Mintz and Huang). Mintz and Huang 
have therefore concluded that ―increased levels of military expenditures dampen 
investment, which reduces growth, thereby reducing the ability of governments to 
allocate more funds to welfare programs‖16 (Mintz and Huang). This is made possible 
by a high military budget, which crowds out investment, or at least reduces it, which in 
turn slows technical expansion of existing capital. The military expenditure ―competes‖ 
with investment because they are substitutes of each other. Governments may impose a 
higher tax rate or will borrow heavily (will issue bonds). This is shown in Figure 2: 
                                                 
14 These growth rates include GNP, labor, capital, land, investment, defense, personal income, household 
expenditure within the Soviet Union.  
15 The classical ―guns versus butter‖ tradeoff case refers to a country‘s investment option between two 
goods and is shown in its production possibilities frontier, or PPF. If the production or quantity of a good 
(e.g. guns) goes up, then a certain quantity of the other good (butter) will decrease. This is its opportunity 
cost.  
16 Some of these programs might include education, housing and healthcare. 
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Figure 2 – Guns vs. Butter: An Indirect Link 
 
Source: Mintz, Alex and Chi Huang. "Guns versus Butter: The Indirect Link." American Journal of Political 
Science 35.3 (n.d.): 738-757. 
 
 While this might stimulate the economy in the short run, long run growth will be 
seriously affected by the reduction in investment (Mintz and Huang). Therefore 
military expenditures negatively affect economic growth because they dampen 
investment. On the other hand, countries that rely on investment will see high economic 
growth17 and an increase in education spending, such as human capital. As human 
capital increases, income per capita will increase, reducing the government‘s liabilities 
to provide for social benefits. This is true only if a country is experiencing a high growth 
rate. The Soviet Union did not fall under the latter category. This is because their 
military expenditures exceeded any appropriate ratio to consumer expenditures. In 
comparison to G7 countries, the Soviet Union had an extremely high military 
expenditure (Bremmer and Kesselring). They took the data from G7 countries as these 
countries are all advanced countries and dominated the 20th century, in terms of real 
growth.  
 Bremmer and Kesselring took annual data from 1960 – 1991 and use them in a 
―‘two way‘ fixed and random effects model that pools cross-sections and time series‖ 
(Bremmer and Kesselring). The sign of    is expected to be positive, given the 
relationship between population and real GDP growth. Knowing what the sign of    is 
                                                 
17 Investment was crucial in the United State‘s growth rate in the 20th century. Average annual growth in 
the U.S. from 1929 – 1982 was 2.90%, of which investment was nearly one-fifth (Mintz and Huang). 
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will tell us if military expenditure is correlated to the change in real GDP. This model is 
estimated as: 
                                        (5) 
 
Where      is the percentage change in real GDP in country i observed from the previous year 
(time t-1) to the current year (time t) 
      is the amount of current defense spending in country i expressed as a percentage of 
country i‘s current GDP 
      is the percentage change percentage of the population in country i in the previous 
year (time t-1) to the current year (time t) 
    is a binary dummy variable and captures country specific effects 
    is another binary variable that captures specific time effects that impacts each country 
in the same way 
 
 Bremmer and Kesselring found that the adjusted    of G7 countries was 0.66, or 
significant, in that the variables tested indicate a good overall ―fit.‖ The variables they 
used, which are (1) defense spending of overall GDP and (2) the percentage change in 
population, explain the variation in the percentage change in GDP. Based on their 
regression and analysis, Bremmer and Kesselring conclude that ―the opportunity cost of 
increased military expenditures is foregone economic growth‖ (Bremmer and 
Kesselring). Table 6 includes their results of    and    
 
Table 6 – Regression Results: Fixed Effects Model 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Overall Constant 7.625 0.959 
Defense/GDP Percent (  ) -1.272 0.279 
Percentage Δ in Population (  )  0.117 0.072 
Source: Bremmer, Dale and Randall Kesselring. "The Opportunity Cost of Super Power Status: the Tradeoff 
Between Defense Spending and Economic Prosperity." (1998)  
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Even though Soviet data is scarce and hardly reliable, the data included in Table 
6 is important for our analysis of Soviet military expenditures. In his autobiography, 
Gorbachev states that only 2 or 3 people knew of the true scope of the Soviet Union‘s 
military expenditure. When economic leaders decided to release the true figures in the 
early 1980s, many were surprised to learn that ―military expenditure was not 16 per 
cent of the state budget… but rather 40 per cent‖ (Gorbachev). Based on this revelation, 
Gorbachev feared economic and social collapse, and therefore made it a goal to 
dramatically reform the economic system. He based his ideas largely on western 
economies. These reforms did allow more firms to set their own prices (within specific 
parameters set by centralized planners), as wage inflation dramatically increased in 
1988 and 1989. M2 also dramatically increased, indicating mass inflation. Table 7 shows 
data from 1985 – 1991: 
 
Table 7– Soviet Macroeconomic Performance, 1985 - 1991 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
GNP growth 0.8 4.1 1.3 2.1 1.5 -4.0 -13.0 
Gross investment growth 3.0 8.4 5.6 6.2 4.7 -2.5 -6.0 
Budget deficit/GDP (%) 2.4 6.2 8.8 11.0 9.5 8.3 20.0 
Retail price index 3.5 4.4 4.5 6.0 8.0 20.0 100.0 
M2 growth NA 8.5 14.7 14.1 14.8 20.2 75.0 
Nominal wage increase 2.9 2.9 3.7 8.3 9.4 12.3 70.0 
Source: Fischer, Stanley. "Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now." The Transition in Eastern Europe. Ed. 
Olivier Jean Blanchard, Kenneth A Froot and Jeffrey D Sachs. Vol. 1. University of Chicago Press, 1994. 221-258. 
 
The Cold War was responsible for long-term decline. Socialism held the belief in 
the basic ―badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction‖ (Kennan). The 
Soviet regime was willing to go to war with the greatest superpower on earth, the 
United States. Unfortunately this strategy came at a cost for Soviet society.  
2.1.1 Production Possibility Curves (PPC) 
The discussion of declining consumer surplus thus far can be attributed to the 
tradeoffs between consumption and defense. Figure 3 is relevant to our discussion of 
tradeoffs between defense (horizontal graph) and nondefense goods, or consumer 
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consumption (vertical graph). It shows how much military burden was on the Soviet 
economy, based on prices. The Model PPC is the best tradeoff, based on opportunity 
costs.18  Actual PPC with accurate prices assumes no underpriced good exists, and 
portrays accurate prices. However, Actual PPC with distorted prices shows the tradeoff 
change is distorted prices (an underpricing of defense goods). If goods are underpriced 
it appears as though military spending is not a burden, making consumers better off.  
Figure 3 shows the common tradeoff that occurred between consumption and assumed 
undervalued defense goods: 
Figure 3 – Production Possibility Curves of Aggregate Economic Model 
 
Source: Hildebrandt, Gregory G. "Models of the Military Sector in the Soviet Economy." The Impoverished 
Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden. Ed. Charles Wolf and Henry S. Rowen. San Francisco: 
Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990. 221-253. 
 
2.1.2 Diseconomies of Scale 
Everything I have talked about thus far eventually led to a series of diseconomies 
of scale, which usually ―result from the problems and added cost[s] associated with 
large bureaucracies‖ (Wessels) anyway. In the long run this created a high surplus of 
                                                 
18 Opportunity costs can be defined as the ―benefits that could have been obtained by choosing the next 
best alternative‖ (Black, Hashimzade and Myles). If the Soviet Union‘s next best alternative was 
investment in R&D, instead of military expenditures, it would weigh the costs to see if it would benefit or 
lose from choosing this ―opportunity.‖ 
33 
 
manufacturing goods and a deficit of consumer goods, not to mention higher costs of 
imports and a soaring cost of living (Grigoriev, Ivanova and Nikolaenko). I believe that 
had the Soviet Union never implemented centralized planning, diseconomies of scale 
would not have been an issue, or at least would not have been as severe. Figure 4 shows 
economies of scales graphically. An economy of scale is a situation where average costs 
decrease as quantity increases (point A). A diseconomy of scale results in an increase in 
average costs as quantity increases (Point C). A minimum efficient scale, or constant 
returns to scaleThe Soviet Union‘s average total costs (ATC) of Soviet products were 
going up as output expanded: 
 
Figure 4 - The Soviet Union’s Diseconomy of Scale Problem 
 
 Source: Author 
 
 One reason economies of scale were not found in the Soviet Union may be the 
result of low international global competitiveness, which often forces firms and 
businesses to economize and reduce and/or eliminate costs. When firms compete 
internationally, production volume increases, per-unit costs decrease, and profits are 
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greater than they would be under strictly . Firms would been able to utilize their capital 
However, only increased production was a priority in the Soviet Union. Had firms been 
allowed to profit 
3. Some Microeconomic Behaviors in the Soviet Union 
 
No unemployment but nobody works. 
Nobody works but productivity increases. 
Productivity increases but the shops are empty. 
The shops are empty but fridges are full. 
Fridges are full but nobody is satisfied. 
Nobody is satisfied but all vote unanimously (A. V. Ledeneva). 
 
I have explained the four major weaknesses in the Soviet Union‘s socialist model, 
as outlined in the main introduction: its (1) obsession to maintain political power at all 
costs, (2) faulty priorities, which led to inefficiencies, (3) high emphasis on military and 
defense spending, and (4) its inability to handle external shocks. I believe that in order 
to fully grasp these problems, we must understand their relationship to Soviet culture 
and behavior. Understanding consumer behavior can help us to draw more accurate 
conclusions. I conclude that the bureaucracy was an oligarch system, where top-down 
reforms were destructive, because communists at the top felt threatened during 
―Gorbachev‘s Idea‖ (Zubok), or when Gorbachev implemented radical economic 
reforms in the 1980s, which resulted in serious consequences. This is due to socialism 
being ―defined more by its ideas than by its institutions‖ (Bandelin).19 Gorbachev had 
severely altered the Soviet Union‘s political system by taking power away from the 
centralized government and Communist Party. He wanted national elections and 
minority parties to be represented. By changing the political structure of the Soviet 
                                                 
19 i.e. it is much harder to change people and their behavior than it is to change the institutions and 
systems that confine them. It is my belief that just because an institution has changed does not imply the 
people who are governed by it, even those who govern the institution, are willing to change. Only people 
can truly change themselves, despite the strongest influences. 
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Union Gorbachev was essentially asking for an economic collapse. George Kennan, 
well-known ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 1940s, had warned against this 
notion many years before. He stated that ―if anything were ever to occur to disrupt the 
unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed 
overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable national 
societies‖ (Kennan). This paper has shown how far the Communist Party was willing to 
go to preserve that power. 
This section discusses all Soviet citizens as optimal consumers, or consumers 
who make every economic transaction the most beneficial, given the specific conditions. 
These comparisons are also briefly analyzed. First, I will discuss Gorbachev‘s radical 
policy changes during the 1980s that swept the country, impacting everyone‘s entire 
way of life. Second, I will discuss what cognitive dissonance is and what it meant in the 
Soviet context. I will also explain who tolkachi were and how they aggravated the 
effectiveness of major policies. Finally, I will explain what blat is and how its practice 
became all too common on all levels of society, which indirectly affected policy changes. 
3.1 The Gorbachev Idea 
 By the 1980s, the xenophobia20 initiated by Stalin and the détente and stagnation 
effects during the Brezhnev era had contributed to issues so grand in the Soviet Union 
that ―nobody could have reformed the Soviet system and Soviet empire. They could 
only be destroyed completely‖ (Zubok). To make matters worse, numerous external 
shocks to the economy, including the Cold War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
nuclear accident at Chernobyl muted the impacts of Gorbachev‘s reforms, greatly 
reduced the Soviet Union‘s credibility and ability to maintain its superpower status. 
Specifically referring to the Chernobyl incident and cover-up, Gorbachev stated that 
―our work is now transparent to the whole people, to the whole world. There are no 
interests that could force us to hide the truth‖ (Zubok). The accident at Chernobyl 
                                                 
20 Xenophobia is basically fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners. I believe that it, coupled with the 
hatred of capitalism, was enough to trigger the Cold War. 
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directly led to glasnost’, or the loosening grip of the Communist Party‘s on the media 
and previously disclosed archives, such as the true scope of Stalin‘s purges.   
Gorbachev was an ambitious leader. He unsuccessfully attempted to save 
socialism from stagnation. He believed that by ―removing Brezhnev‘s corrupt cronies 
and inefficient bureaucrats would make the Soviet system run well‖ all the while 
maintaining a centralized planned economy (Zubok). Gorbachev wanted to introduce 
market socialism, similar to what China had done in the late 1970s. But his triple 
reformation process of democratization, economic transformation, and decolonization 
of non-Russian republics is what ultimately brought the Soviet Union to its imminent 
collapse. It was just too much at once for a society to undertake.  
Gorbachev promoted what he called ―new thinking‖ (novoe mushlenie). He had 
recognized that there were just too many defections that prevented the Soviet Union 
from having a dominant voice in the world. He believed the morality of a society does 
impact the production function (as mentioned on page 14): 
 
The moral aspect is of tremendous importance. If we do not effectively revive socialist 
values and a socialist atmosphere in our work collectives and in society as a whole, we 
will fail to carry through the restructuring drive. We can propose the right policies and 
effective mechanisms, but we won‘t accomplish anything if society does not improve 
through consolidation of the moral values of socialism, above all social justice, 
distribution according to labor input, uniform discipline, laws, rules and requirements 
for all (Gorbachev, 1987). 
 
Gorbachev wanted to change the Soviet Union behaviorally, but society just was 
not ready; neither its leaders nor the common folk. His biggest programs, glasnost’ and 
perestroika, aimed to achieve a new production function, one that had never been tried 
in Soviet history. This was first and foremost on his agenda. He also wanted to boost the 
morale and productivity of Soviet workers. The anti-alcohol campaign was such an 
example. It did work, but decreased government revenue enough to cause a financial 
scare (Gorbachev, 1987).  
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 Gorbachev was, in part, was also a community organizer. He wanted the whole 
of society to join together to carry out his agenda. He felt that socialism had not yet been 
achieved and that its progression had become stagnant. He wanted to clean up society 
and get back on track, or revert to Leninist roots. Unfortunately many saw his agenda 
as damning to Soviet fundamentals. He states that ―revolution requires the demolition 
of all that is obsolete, stagnant and hinders fast progress. Without demolition, you 
cannot clear the site for new construction‖ (Gorbachev, 1987). Glasnost’ and perestroika 
easily demolished much of the socialist structure, but failed to provide this ―new 
construction.‖ Gorbachev admitted that true socialism was never constructed because 
the wrong forms and methods ―were canonized, idealized and turned into dogma‖ 
(Gorbachev, 1987). He blames the early revolutionists for speaking in theoretical terms 
and for not defining the attributes of socialism. He took it upon himself to define what 
socialism is, where the pitfalls were, and make the necessary adjustments.  
3.1.1 Glasnost’ 
Referring to glasnost’ Gorbachev stated ―Communists want the truth, always and 
under all circumstances. Governments should not be the privilege of a narrow circle of 
professionals‖ (Suny). Lenin had always been open to the idea of no secrecy, and 
glasnost’, according to Gorbachev, would make it easier for people to understand the 
past and present, and to understand the economic and social changes that were being 
implemented. He even compared glasnost’ to air: one needs both in order to survive. He 
also claimed that democracy is not possible without glasnost’.  
Glasnost’ alone could have brought the Soviet Union down. This bold statement 
is backed by Gorbachev himself in his autobiography when he stated ―the reform of our 
enormous state indeed demanded decentralization and redistribution of powers 
between the centre and the regions. But the local elites tried to paint this need the 
exaggerated colors of ‗national survival.‘ It worked!‖ (Gorbachev). Glasnost’ was 
effective at opening up the freedom of the press. But with this new freedom came a 
drawback: new allegations of Soviet cover-ups and the real truth behind the Great 
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Purges of 1937-38. This mentality of new truth greatly affected the masses. Consider the 
following conversation taken from The New Russians: 
 
In 1990 Zakharov, a contributor to the Soviet TV show Vzglyad, which advocated the 
economic and political change at the time, was asked about Communism and socialism. 
He replied ―Oh, Communism and all that? ...I don‘t know what socialism is.‖ But, he 
advised me (the author of The New Russians) ―….you must take into account the Russian 
mentality.‖ 
―What do you mean?‖ I asked. 
―This is a country of poor people, with a distorted psychology, who for seventy 
years have been deceived and pumped full of ideology.‖ 
―So what do you do?‖ I asked. 
―You have to explain everything very simply to them – this was this and that 
was that,‖ he replied. ―I want to have a program showing people that the Revolution was 
not made for them. This is all very painful. When you tell them that they have been 
deceived, they don‘t believe you. It turns out many of them prefer to be fooled rather 
than to know the truth‖ (H. Smith). 
 
Gorbachev understood the task at hand: he needed to create a strong center, 
thereby creating strong republics. This would involve new foundations, such as 
―security, coordination of fundamentals of economic and social policy, coordination of 
foreign policy, maintaining order at the border, and so forth‖ (Gorbachev). He did this 
by using the mass media through newspapers and television media to further his own 
political objectives. Many at home were taking part in the action for the very first time, 
watching the Communist Party in action during the All-Union Conferences. No one at 
the time knew to what degree how the effects of glasnost’ would shape the economic 
and social landscape of the Soviet Union. 
3.1.2 Perestroika  
A strong believer in socialism, Gorbachev stated that perestroika would ―show 
that socialism is not only capable of coping with the historic task of reaching heights of 
scientific and technological progress, but that it can handle it with a maximum of social 
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and moral efficiency, by the methods of democracy, for the people, and, thanks to their 
own efforts, intellect, skills, talents, conscience and awareness of their responsibility to 
other people‖ (Gorbachev, 1987). Historically, the Russian people had become all too 
accustomed to leaders who had ruled with an iron fist (Suny). That changed when 
Khrushchev was ousted by the Politburo, the elite ruling power. Brezhnev too was 
considered a ―great, very great mistake.‖ Worse, the quick successions of General 
Secretaries Brezhnev (1982), Andropov (1984), and Chernenko (1985) left volatility in 
Moscow. Nonetheless by this time the Soviet Union had loosened its grip too much on 
the top and Moscow became an oligarchic system 21  (Aslund, 2002). By the time 
Gorbachev came to power, it was impossible to implement any top-down reform 
because ―in order to make a successful social transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy and from a state economy to a market economy it is essential to a have a 
viable state authority. The state comes first‖ (Suny). Gorbachev‘s personality and over 
self-confidence did not win the people over. In fact, his message was often vague and 
confusing. The masses did not know what to make of it.  
Progress in Gorbachev‘s revolution was very slow, largely because of the 
inability to adapt to the progress of the information age, which would have expanded 
its economic growth. Heymann, as quoted in Ofer (1987), labels the Soviet Union a 
―handicapped‖ society, or a place that was ill-equipped for a successful economic 
restructuring which was initiated by Gorbachev: 
 
Soviet society – as is now (1985) beginning to be recognized by the new Gorbachev 
leadership – is handicapped by a socio-political organization ill suited to the adoption 
and assimilation of an information-intensive culture: its highly centralized approach to 
management and decision making; its dearth of reliable data bases and the wall of 
secrecy with which surrounds them; the poor quality and availability of its 
telecommunications links; its discouragement of entrepreneurship and risk taking 
(uncoordinated small-team, competitive ventures do not exist); its tradition of ignoring 
                                                 
21 The state enterprise managers did not feel accountable to anyone, which meant they could do as they 
please, delaying any economic reform offered by Gorbachev.  
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the needs and wishes of customers and users, and its abhorrence of the wide-open, 
chaotic marketplace, where a staggering variety of profit-motivated buyers and sellers 
contend – these and other features hamper and constrain the society‘s ability to adjust to 
and benefit from the information revolution (Ofer). 
 
 It had taken decades to achieve this society, and would take even longer to revert 
to the days of high growth and high output per worker figures in the 1950s. Had 
Gorbachev known then what scholars know now about this internal collapse of the 
Soviet Union, he might have opted for an alternative plan. Many scholars still debate 
whether implementing both perestroika and glasnost’ simultaneously was effective 
(Ofer). Had perestroika been able to pursue its course (without any effects from 
glasnost’) it might have achieved the intended results. Research analysis22 has shown 
that economic transitions (from centrally planned to market-oriented) are satisfactory 
when approached gradually, like China had done, starting in 1978, in comparison to the 
Soviet Union and later Russia‘s ―shock therapy‖ approach (Sachs and Woo).  
 Even if the Soviet people had a clear understanding of what Gorbachev was 
doing and had agreed that it would benefit them, we cannot assume that they would 
accept it, because they had a clear case of cognitive dissonance: they had been ignoring 
the problems they were facing for quite some time. 
3.2 Cognitive Dissonance  
 Soviet Russia had a severe case of cognitive dissonance, which is ―the need to 
resolve contradictory or conflicting beliefs, values, concepts, perceptions, [and] only 
occurs when we are attached to our attitudes or beliefs‖ (Tompkins and Lawley). 
Psychologists say that ―no problem can be solved until an individual assumes the 
responsibility for solving it‖ (Peck). Economic and political leaders knew of the 
problems but did not address them, thinking they might go away, despite their 
                                                 
22 Some indicators include: the employment change in various industries, output per worker, income per 
worker, state-controlled enterprises, economic structure, investment, and international trade. The main 
economic difference between China and the Soviet Union was the Soviet Union‘s ―overbuilt‖ industry: 
too much heavy industry and too little light industry, state subsidies, and the social welfare system (Sachs 
and Woo). 
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―monopolistic capabilities‖ (Lange, Part Two). Their problem was their ―unwillingness 
to delay gratification,‖ or to confront problems willingly rather than being forced to by 
circumstances (Peck). In addition, any threat that endangered the regime resulted in 
inefficient methods of production, as we saw with certain externalities.   
Managers used tactics like tolkachi (pushers) and blat as well, two terms every 
Soviet was familiar with. A tolkach was a worker whose sole purpose was to manipulate 
―people, procedures, and paperwork‖ (Klugman). He would collect supplies that a firm 
was short on by traveling to various suppliers and bargain with them, often using 
barter from the very firm he represents. The firm would meet its centrally planned 
target, only if the thousands of tolkachi were successful. This informal and risky tactic 
could have been avoided altogether had a local firms been able to design their own 
target plans. 
3.3 Blat and the Underground Economy 
One of the most damaging behaviors practiced in the Soviet Union was the 
practice of blat, which describes an action by an individual or a firm in hopes of using 
their own personal influence for personal gain or special treatment. This often occurred 
in the underground economy, to which blat was a huge contributor. In the Soviet Union 
prices were fixed. State-controlled prices were set well below demand. Malleable 
property rights and low administrative salaries resulted in bribery and corruption. All 
of the above indirectly contributed to the 1970s stagnation period, which crippled 
economy by the 1980s, and the eventually caused the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Both government officials and civilians were to blame. 
There were certain prerequisites in order for blat to work. On an economical 
level, it was practiced because of the limited commodities available. On a legal issue, 
people were not sure that they would be protected by the law, which increased the need 
for close personal relationships. On a cultural level, Russians were part of a collectivist 
culture in order to combat the obstacles of the system. On a historical note ―take and 
give‖ practices and mutual aid have been common in Russia for generations. On a 
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market approach, reduction of competition, risk avoidance, and control over the market 
all became common (Ledeneva). 
Blat seriously affected the behavior of Soviet society. It changed people 
economically and seriously affected how they transitioned from a centrally-planned 
economy to a market, capitalist economy during the 1990s:  
 
Blat aided and impeded the growth of the Soviet economy. The system was more efficient 
when independent agents circumvented artificial price and production controls, thus 
buffering average citizens from the inefficient allocation of resources by centralized 
planners. Growth in the unofficial sector far outstripped growth in the stagnant official 
economy. Yet obligatory law-breaking had a corrosive effect on society, and undermined 
the legitimacy of the state. Although authorities periodically attempted crackdowns, their 
ultimate targets were themselves highly placed party officials. Brezhnev's own family 
was deeply involved in the black market. Many observers mistook black marketers for 
proto-capitalists. However, when the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 took with it the 
state-planning system, they evolved not into entrepreneurs, but into large-scale criminal 
racketeers who throttle the economy today no less than state planners once did (Geldem). 
 
Since there was an abundance of scarce products, Soviet society was full of 
corner-cutting to satisfy its wants. No one cared, just as long as the means justified the 
end results. In the Soviet Union, blat was used to buy both basic consumer products and 
various foreign goods, both of which were scarce. During the 1970s and 1980s new 
products like washing machines, televisions, tape recorders, cars, and car parts were 
impossible to buy without blat. These products were evenly sold and distributed in the 
Soviet Union by means of ―specific allocation slips‖ through organizations and 
enterprises, which in turn selected the employees who could purchase the items, or a 
special selection process. This was also the case for more prestigious and hard-to-get 
products such as chocolate. Products23  and opportunities such as vacations, leisure 
                                                 
23 Products from the West (blue jeans, cigarettes, to name a few) fell into this category. It was possible to 
obtain these products only if you had the right resources and right acquaintances. Long-term 
consequences resulted in a thriving black market.  
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activities, health care, and bearing children certainly required money, but in order to 
reap the most out of the system, Soviets would use blat. Blat could have been avoided, 
or reduced, if the consumer side of economics was given a higher priority.  
  
4. Conclusion 
 The four broad elements of this thesis led to the Soviet Union‘s collapse. The first 
is explained by the struggle to maintain political power, which early policies and 
Stalin‘s xenophobia emphasize, which resulted in scarcity and dampened innovation 
and technology. The second element is defined by the Soviet Union‘s faulty priorities, 
which led to inefficiencies and large amounts of waste. The most common faulty 
priority was the heavy-to-light industry ratio, which contributed to shortages. The third 
element can be explained by the excessive burden of high emphasis on military and 
defense spending, particularly during the Arms Race with the United States. Finally, the 
fourth element proves the Soviet Union was incapable of handling external shocks. 
Gorbachev was really the only Soviet politician who realized that things could not go 
on as they had, which is why he had an extremely hard time convincing his own people 
that his reforms would work. 
 Not surprisingly, Lenin‘s utopia was simply unattainable. Stalin started a cold 
war that the Soviet Union had no way of ever winning: détente and stagnation had 
serious long-term effects. Gorbachev is often labeled the villain in the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, but I have shown the Soviet Union was already on a slippery slope to 
destruction that had started from War Communism. The socialist fundamentals and 
tactics to achieve the output are the negative indicators in our final equation. I maintain 
that the Soviet Union collapsed internally, as a result of pure Soviet propaganda and 
behavior, as macroeconomic indicators tend to show.  
 I really believe that the Soviet Union could have, and should have, been the 
greatest empire in contemporary history. It had lots of potential and its people are 
tough, having been through many personal and national hardships. But the socialist 
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fundamentals were weak. Many of the ideas were theoretical and promoted through 
propaganda methods. Had the Soviet Union started off differently and adjusted its 
priorities, and kept consumers in mind and an entrepreneurial spirit in focus, might still 
be in existence today, threatening the very existence of the United States, China, and 
other developing countries. Its endowment factors24 would have caused its growth to be 
unstoppable.   
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